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953 
TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS: THE DEATH OF DYING 
DECLARATIONS? 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Clay1 
(decided June 28, 2011) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Clay and Sidor Fulcher were convicted of murder in 
the second degree by a jury in the Supreme Court of New York, 
Kings County.2  Clay appealed, claiming that the trial court erred 
when they permitted a police officer to testify in court to a statement 
made by the victim, allegedly violating defendant‟s Sixth Amend-
ment rights under the Confrontation Clause.3  The Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
bars testimonial hearsay evidence from being introduced in a criminal 
trial against a criminal defendant unless the prosecutor puts the out-
of-court declarant on the stand as a witness subject to cross examina-
tion or, alternatively, the prosecutor may show the declarant is pre-
sently unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to con-
front the declarant.4  Article 1, Section 6 of the New York State 
 
1 926 N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2011). 
2 Id. at 601. 
3 Id. 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides, in relevant 
part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  Id.; see also Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (noting that the declarant may only be a witness un-
der the meaning of the Confrontation Clause if the statement is testimonial); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior oppor-
tunity for cross-examination.”). 
1
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Constitution contains a parallel provision.5  Clay stated that the ad-
mission of the officer‟s testimony into evidence violated his constitu-
tional rights under both the federal and state constitutions.6 
The Appellate Division, Second Department held that a 
statement made by the victim of a shooting who did not think he 
would survive to a late-arriving police officer was testimonial in na-
ture, but the Confrontation Clause recognizes an exception for dying 
declarations.7  The victim was shot six times, had difficulty speaking, 
and was informed by a police officer that he doubted his chance of 
survival.8  Under these conditions, the victim made a statement to the 
police identifying his assailant.9  The court held that the statement 
was made under the threat of imminent death; therefore, the state-
ment was admissible in court as a dying declaration, and did not vi-
olate the Confrontation Clause.10 
 
II. THE FACTS OF PEOPLE V. CLAY 
Clay and Fulcher were convicted by a jury of murder in the 
second degree.11  On August 11, 2006, at approximately nine o‟clock 
at night, both Clay and Fulcher approached Igol Isaacs on a local 
street in Brooklyn.12  The defendants shot Isaacs six times with the 
bullets entering his abdomen, back, “kidney, liver, and small and 
large intestines.”13  The bullets also “fractured two vertebrae and the 
spinal cord, and passed into his chest cavity, perforating the middle 
and lower lobes of the right lung.”14  Police Captain Brian McGee re-
 
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.  Article 1, Section 6 of the New York Constitution provides, in 
relevant part: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear 
and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her.”  Id. 
6 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 609. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 610. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 610-11. 
11 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601.  Although both defendants initially contended that the 
statement by Isaacs violated their rights under the Confrontation clause, the appeal only con-
cerns the statement made against Thomas Clay.  Id. 
12 Id. at 600-01. 
13 Id. at 610. 
14 Id. 
2
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sponded to the request for assistance at the location of the shooting.15  
When McGee arrived at the scene of the crime, a police van and other 
officers were already present.16  Without stopping to speak with any 
of the other officers, McGee moved directly toward Isaacs, who was 
on the ground “lying face-up on the sidewalk” next to a police offic-
er.17 
McGee asked Isaacs, “Who shot you?”18  When Isaacs did not 
respond, McGee informed him that it was unlikely he would survive 
the gunshot wounds, and asked for the name of the perpetrator 
again.19  Isaacs said, “Todd shot me.”20  In an attempt to confirm the 
identity of the shooter, McGee inquired, “Todd shot you?”21  Isaacs 
was gasping for air and with his final words he uttered, “No.  No.  
Tom shot me.  Tom.  Tom.”22  Isaacs had severe trouble breathing 
and was unable to speak any further.23  McGee questioned Isaacs for 
Tom‟s last name but failed to receive a response from the mortally 
wounded victim.24  Then, McGee spoke with another officer but did 
not discuss the conversation with Isaacs and pushed back a crowd of 
people in order to prevent contamination of the crime scene.25  Isaacs 
was rushed to the hospital and died a few hours later.26  That same 
night, Yvette Clay contacted the police and stated that she witnessed 
her estranged husband Thomas Clay and his cousin Sidor Fulcher 
shoot Isaacs.27  The police recovered seven .9 millimeter shell casings 
and one discharged .45 caliber shell casing at the scene of the 
crime.28 
 
15 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 600. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  The court recognized that there were no medical personnel on the scene at the time 
who could have disclosed an opinion as to Isaacs‟ condition.  Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610. 
20 Id. at 600-01. 
21 Id. at 601. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
25 Id.  The facts indicate that a crowd of people gathered at the scene of the incident and 
Officer McGee sought to find any possible witness to the crime.  Id. at 606. 
26 Id. at 601. 
27 Id. 
28 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601.  All the shell casings at the crime scene were “found to have 
been fired from the same gun.”  Id. 
3
Gitomer: Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
956 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
Clay and Fulcher were indicted on multiple charges, including 
“one count of murder in the second degree . . . and were jointly tried 
before a jury.”29  Before trial, counsel for both defendants objected to 
admission of Officer McGee‟s testimony on the ground that it would 
violate the defendants‟ rights under the Sixth Amendment.30  The 
New York Supreme Court held that the statements made by Isaacs to 
Officer McGee were not testimonial.31  The court admitted the testi-
mony of Officer McGee into evidence under the dying declaration 
exception to hearsay.32  The court held that the statements made by 
Isaacs shortly before his death were not barred by the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.33  Ultimately, Officer McGee testi-
fied at trial to the statements made by the mortally wounded Isaacs 
the night of the shooting.34  The jury convicted both defendants of 
murder in the second degree.35 
Clay appealed the decision on the grounds that it was a consti-
tutional error to allow McGee to testify to the conversation with 
Isaacs which identified “Tom” as the shooter.36  The Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department agreed with the New York Supreme Court‟s 
decision to permit the testimony into evidence as a dying declaration, 
and affirmed the judgment.37 
 
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN THE PEOPLE V. 
CLAY DECISION 
A. Confrontation Clause 
The court began its opinion by determining whether the 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36). 
31 Id. 
32 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.  The appellant did not argue that the State Constitution is more protective of the 
right of confrontation than the United States Constitution; however, the court based the anal-
ysis on relevant New York case law.  Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 609 (citing People v. Bradley, 
862 N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 2006)). 
37 Id. at 601. 
4
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statements made by Isaacs to Officer McGee were testimonial.38  The 
analysis used by the court was set forth in Davis v. Washington,39 
where the United States Supreme Court looked to the primary pur-
pose of the interrogation and whether statements made by the decla-
rant were intended to be used for criminal prosecution.40  When 
McGee arrived at the scene, he immediately approached Isaacs and 
asked one very specific question, “Who shot you?”41  This was a 
pointed question, designed only to learn the identity of the perpetra-
tor.42  The court noted that, “[n]o such precautionary or remedial pur-
pose can reasonably be attributed to McGee‟s inquiry as demonstrat-
ed most prominently by the remainder of the conversation.”43  McGee 
informed Isaacs, “I don‟t think you are going to make it” and repeat-
edly asked who shot him.44  These facts indicate that McGee was not 
trying to assist with an ongoing emergency, but rather to give Isaacs a 
final opportunity to disclose the identity of the assailants.45  After 
McGee learned the identity of the shooter, he sought to locate and se-
cure evidence as well as find any witness to the crime.46 
While the United States Supreme Court recognized in Davis 
that initial inquiries made by police officers tend to produce non-
testimonial statements, it explicitly acknowledged that statements as-
certained at crime scene under certain circumstances are testimoni-
al.47  McGee questioned Isaacs at the crime scene shortly after the 
shooting occurred but the court held that “the totality of the surround-
ing circumstances objectively indicates that McGee‟s primary pur-
pose was „to nail down the truth about past criminal events.‟ ”48  
McGee “intended to and did elicit statements that [in effect] „do pre-
cisely what a witness does on an examination [in court when he] “ac-
cuses” a perpetrator of a crime.‟ ”49  Taking all relevant information 
 
38 Id. at 605-06. 
39 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
40 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
41 Id. at 600. 
42 Id. at 606. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 606.  The police officer did give Isaacs what turned out to be his 
final opportunity to bear witness against his assailants.  Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 607. 
48 Id. (quoting People v. Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d 1019, 1027 (N.Y. 2008)). 
49 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 607 (quoting Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1027). 
5
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into account, the court concluded that the statements made by Isaacs 
constituted testimonial hearsay.50 
B. Dying Declarations 
Next, the court focused on whether or not the testimonial 
statement falls under an exception which may be invoked to admit 
these statements against the criminal defendant.51  Hearsay is general-
ly inadmissible, subject to various exceptions including the dying 
declaration.52  The court focused on this exception since case law 
provides that “ „dying declarations are admissible on a trial for mur-
der as to the fact of the homicide‟ ” when the declarant is the vic-
tim.53 
The court recognized that the Supreme Court in Crawford did 
not clearly define the common-law hearsay exception of dying decla-
rations.54  Instead of following federal precedent, the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department joined the decision of other state courts and 
concluded that the Confrontation Clause “ „incorporates an exception 
for testimonial dying declarations.‟ ”55  Although the appellant did 
not argue that the State Constitution is more protective than the Fed-
eral Constitution, the court applied New York law in the Clay deci-
sion since citizens are generally afforded more protection under the 
State Constitution.56 
The court recognized that dying declarations are rooted in 
case law such as the New York Court of Appeals decision in People 
v. Bradley.57  A fair reading of case law indicates that “the „requisite 
state of mind of [the] declarant may be found from all circumstances 
surrounding the statement sought to be admitted,‟ and the declarant 
need not have „actually expressed a certainty of impending death.‟ ”58  
The court recognized that several relevant factors should be consi-
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892)). 
54 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 608. 
55 Id. at 609 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6). 
56 Id. 
57 862 N.E.2d 79. 
58 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (quoting People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109, 114 (N.Y. 
1986)). 
6
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dered to determine the state of mind of the declarant, including the 
condition of the declarant, the nature and the severity of the wound, 
and whether the objective actions are associated with an expectation 
of imminent death.59 
The court held the high standard that invokes dying declara-
tions was satisfied in Clay since Isaacs made the statement under the 
hopeless expectation that death was near at hand.60  Isaacs was shot 
six times and the bullets entered through several vital organs as well 
as the spinal cord.61  The court concluded that Isaacs made these 
statements as his condition was declining.62  After Isaacs identified 
his assailant, he was unable to respond to subsequent inquiries due to 
the severe nature of his injuries.63  Taking all relevant circumstances 
into account, the court affirmed the district court‟s decision to admit 
Isaacs‟ statement to Officer McGee as a dying declaration.64 
 
IV. OVERVIEW 
A. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
reads, in pertinent part, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”65  The right of confronta-
tion mainly serves to secure the criminal defendant the opportunity of 
cross-examination.66  Allowing the opportunity for cross-examination 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id.  Isaacs was struggling to breathe and was unable to speak after naming “Tom” as the 
perpetrator.  Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 611. 
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
66 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970). 
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to 
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes ad-
mitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal 
examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused 
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the 
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face 
7
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is significant because it is universally recognized as a primary me-
thod for determining the truth.  Most legal evidence containing oral 
testimony may only be admissible when the statements are subject to 
this stringent form of scrutiny.67 
As long as the declarant is a witness subject to cross-
examination, “the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting 
the declarant‟s out-of-court statements.”68  The witness is there to tes-
tify against the one accused of the crime and must “bear testimony.”69  
Testimony is defined as a “solemn declaration or affirmation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”70  Under cer-
tain circumstances, testimony given by an out-of-court declarant may 
be admissible in a criminal proceeding.71  This balances the Confron-
tation Clause protection with the danger of admitting out-of-court 
statements into evidence.72 
 
B. Article 1, Section 6 of the New York State 
Constitution 
The New York Constitution contains a Confrontation Clause 
counterpart which explicitly states, in pertinent part, “[i]n any trial in 
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and 
 
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his de-
meanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief. 
Id. at 157-58 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. 247, 242-43). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 158.  The declarant must testify as a witness and be subject to full cross-
examination.  Id. 
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under 
oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding 
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the 
witness to submit to cross-examination, the „greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth;‟ (3) permits the jury that is to decide 
the defendant‟s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making 
his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. 
Green, 399 U.S. at 158.  However, “the out-of-court statement may have been made under 
circumstances subject to none of these protections.”  Id. 
69 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 59. 
72 Green, 399 U.S. at 158. 
8
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defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted 
with the witnesses against him or her.”73  Although criminal defen-
dants in New York may allege violations under both the federal and 
state constitutions, they are subject to the same interpretation.74 
 
V. THE DYING DECLARATION HEARSAY 
EXCEPTION 
Dying declarations are a long recognized exception to the 
hearsay rules in the United States court systems and date back to the 
middle of the 18th century.75  This exception to the hearsay rule ad-
mits dying declarations in homicide cases under certain circums-
tances when the deceased made a declaration identifying the perpe-
trator after receiving the fatal blow.76  For a statement to be 
introduced into evidence as a dying declaration, the declarant must be 
unavailable and must identify the perpetrator under the sense of im-
pending death where there is absolutely no chance of recovery.77  It is 
not sufficient if the declarant makes the statement under the assump-
tion that death is possible or even likely.78  A number of factors must 
be considered in assessing whether the statement was made under the 
certainty of impending death including the improvement or decline of 
the condition, the nature and severity of the declarant‟s injuries, and 
whether or not actions were taken which are generally associated 
with an expectation of imminent death.79 
 
 
73 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
74 Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 80. 
75 See Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818). 
76 King v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353-54 (1789); King v. Reason, 93 Eng. Rep. 
659, 661 (1722). 
77 Mattox, 146 U.S. at 151.  Statements made with the belief that death is near are deemed 
to be truthful, similar to a statement made under oath.  Id. at 152. 
78 Nieves, 67 N.E.2d at 113. 
79 Id. at 114. 
9
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A. The Federal Courts’ Application of Dying 
Declarations 
Dying declarations are deeply rooted in our justice system and 
have a long history of recognition by the United States Supreme 
Court.80  In 1892, the Court in Mattox v. United States
81
 stated, “dy-
ing declarations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of 
the homicide and the person by whom it was committed, in favor of 
the defendant as well as against him.”82  The Court held that the party 
attempting to introduce these declarations into evidence must show 
these statements were made under a sense of impending death due to 
the nature and extent of the injuries or the conduct and communica-
tion made by the victim as well as any medical personnel.83 
Five years after the Court‟s decision in Mattox, it faced 
another dying declaration issue in Carver v. United States.84  The 
Court recognized that dying declarations are an exception to the gen-
eral rule that only sworn testimony can be received since the fear of 
impending death can be assumed to be as powerful as the obligation 
of an oath.85  Also, the Court noted that the dying declarations are 
admissible “to prevent an entire failure of justice, as it frequently 
happens that no other witnesses to the homicide are present.”86 
The Supreme Court clarified the situations where dying decla-
rations may be admissible in Shepard v. United States.87  Shepard 
was convicted for the murder of his wife by mercury poisoning.88  
The trial court admitted the evidence of the victim‟s statement, “Dr. 
Shepard has poisoned me” and appellant contended it error to admit 
this evidence as a dying declaration.89  The Court held that the decla-
rant spoke with the hope of recovery since her illness began on May 
20th and she showed great improvement until almost a month later 
 
80 See Mattox, 146 U.S. at 151 (noting that dying declarations are admissible in murder 
trials under certain circumstances). 
81
146 U.S. 140 (1892). 
82 Id. at 151. 
83 Id.  Medical personnel on scene may inform the victim about the severity of his or her 
condition.  Id. 
84 Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897). 
85 Id. at 695-96. 
86 Id. at 697. 
87 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). 
88 Id. at 97. 
89 Id. at 98. 
10
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when she died on June 15th.90  There was no indication that the 
statement would be used to charge her husband with murder; rather, 
she spoke as an ill woman voicing her beliefs and conjectures of the 
present moment.91  The Court recognized that “[h]omicide may not 
be imputed to a defendant on the basis of mere suspicions, even when 
they are the suspicions of the dying.”92  In order to admit the declara-
tion into evidence, there must be personal knowledge as to the acts 
that are declared.93 
More recently, the Second Circuit confronted a dying declara-
tion issue in Rao v. Artuz.94  Rao was convicted of murder in the 
second degree due to the shooting death of Harold Gillard.95  Rao 
contended on appeal that Gillard‟s dying declarations were improper-
ly admitted at trial in violation of the Confrontation Clause.96  After 
Gillard was shot, he stated that the perpetrator was “the fat man” who 
“works for a fellow named Vinnie.”97  The Second Circuit upheld the 
admission of this testimony as a dying declaration.98 
The Southern District of New York applied the dying declara-
tion exception in Paul v. Ercole99 and Figueroa v. Ercole.100  In Paul, 
Thompson was the victim of a shooting who stated, “Jermaine, he 
shot me . . . Mom, Dreds did it.  I‟m going to die.”101  The court held 
that the victim‟s dying declaration met the criteria for admissibility 
since the statement was made “with an awareness of impending 
death” and was presumed to be reliable.102  Conversely, in Figueroa 
v. Ercole, the Southern District of New York held that the statement 
 
90 Id. at 99. 
91 Id. at 100. 
92 Shepard, 290 U.S. at 101. 
93 Id. 
94 No. 97-2703, 1999 WL 980847 (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 1999). 
95 Id. at *1.  Edward Jordan shot Gilliard, but Rao was convicted under the theory that he 
hired Jordan to kill Gillard because of a debt.  Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Rao, 1999 WL 980847, at *2.  The court admitted the dying declaration only for the 
purpose of identifying the assailant.  Id.  The court did not allow this evidence for other pur-
poses including the fact that the victim believed he was shot because of a debt or to infer that 
someone other than the gunman was involved in the shooting.  Id. 
99 No. 07 Civ. 9462, 2010 WL 2899645 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2010). 
100 No. 10 Civ. 3262, 2011 WL 3359682 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011). 
101 Paul, 2010 WL 2899645, at *1-2. 
102 Id. at *3.  There were also three other witnesses to the crime who corroborated the dy-
ing declaration evidence.  Id. at *2. 
11
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made by the declarant was not admissible as a dying declaration.103  
Figueroa shot a man named Pressley twice where one bullet entered 
the abdomen and the other bullet grazed his leg.104  Pressley‟s breath-
ing returned to normal and he appeared lucid as he was being trans-
ported to the hospital.105  Pressley stated, “I don‟t know who did this 
to me.  I don‟t know nothing,” and died from the wounds a few hours 
later.106  Figueroa attempted to admit this statement as a dying decla-
ration.107  The trial court denied the motion and found that Pressley 
did not believe that he was going to die when the statement was made 
since the majority of his wounds were internal and he could not have 
known their severity.108 
The Southern District of New York decided a case very simi-
lar to the facts of Clay in Nesmith v. Bradt.109  Scott was shot three 
times and the injuries from the wounds caused his demise.110  When 
police officials arrived on scene, Scott informed them that “T” shot 
him and explained to one officer that “T” was “Terrence from 
Soundview.”111  The trial court admitted the statements by the police 
officers into evidence as dying declarations and the appellate court 
affirmed the decision.112 
 
B. The New York Courts’ Application of Dying 
Declarations 
The New York courts have interpreted Article 1, Section 6 of 
the State Constitution to permit dying declarations into evidence in 
certain situations where a fatally wounded victim utters the name of 
the perpetrator with his or her dying breath.113  The New York Court 
 
103 Figueroa, 2011 WL 3359682, at *1. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Figueroa, 2011 WL 3359682, at *1.  The only visible wound was small in size and not 
life threatening.  Id. 
109 Nesmith v. Bradt, No. 08 Civ. 6546, 2009 WL 3189346 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009). 
110 Id. at *1. 
111 Id.  The victim made the same statement to three different police officers who arrived 
at the scene.  Id. 
112 Id. at *3. 
113 People v. Falletto, 96 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1911). 
12
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of Appeals also recognized that in every specific case, the statement 
made by the declarant must be viewed “through a multifaceted prism 
that properly reflects the „core‟ evil the Confrontation Clause was de-
signed to prevent.”114  The Confrontation Clause was adopted with 
the intent to disallow the use of an ex parte examination into evidence 
against a criminal defendant.115 
In New York, dying declarations are admissible in a criminal 
prosecution when the declarant‟s statements concerning his or her 
own death are uttered “with no hope of recovery.”116  The statements 
must be made by the victim of an assault who has the “ „hopeless ex-
pectation that death is near at hand‟ ” and this is the final opportunity 
to disclose the identity of the assailant.117  The Court of Appeals has 
historically been skeptical about the validity of dying declarations for 
two reasons.118  First, dying declarations are hearsay.119  Second, it is 
difficult to prove with certainty that the declarant had no hope of re-
covery.120 
The New York Court of Appeals recognized a clear distinc-
tion between evidence such as business records permitted into evi-
dence since they are independent and objective tests as opposed to 
second hand testimony given by an individual who may be powered 
by motives other than justice.121  There is a question of the reliability 
and authenticity of the statement that is made under suspicion or con-
jecture, especially when the victim is not seen by the jury and subject 
to cross-examination.122 
Another significant issue with this hearsay exception is that it 
must be proven with certainty that the dying declaration was made 
under a sense of impending death and the declarant made these 
statements under the belief that there was absolutely no chance of re-
covery.123  This issue arose in Nieves where the victim was hospita-
 
114 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1029. 
115 Id. 
116 Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 113. 
117 Id. (quoting Shepard, 290 U.S. at 100). 
118 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 People v. Allen, 90 N.E.2d 48, 50-51 (N.Y. 1949). 
122 Id. at 51. 
123 Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 113.  This is an evidence issue and it is difficult to prove this 
element when the declarant is deceased and not available to testify.  Id. at 114.  The court 
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lized with only one stab wound.124  The doctor believed that her con-
dition was stabilizing or improving at the time the victim made the 
statement that asserted the identity of the person who perpetrated the 
assault.125  Despite the fact that the wound was fatal, it was not an in-
jury where the victim would believe that death was imminent.126  In 
order for a statement to be admitted into evidence as a dying declara-
tion, the standard of proof set out by the New York Court of Appeals 
must be satisfied.127  An important element in this standard of proof 
requires that the declarant must believe death was close at hand.128  In 
Nieves, the court determined that this high standard of proof was not 
satisfied since it is unlikely that the declarant believed she was going 
to suffer imminent death from her relatively minor injuries.129 
In contrast to Nieves, the court in Clay concluded that Isaacs 
identified his assailant under a sense of impending death.130  Isaacs 
was mortally wound and suffering severely from six gunshot 
wounds.131  The bullets entered Isaacs‟ abdomen, back, and chest 
cavity, puncturing his kidney, liver, small and large intestines, and 
the right lung.132  The bullets also fractured two vertebrae and the 
spinal cord.133  At the time Isaacs made the statement to McGee, he 
was struggling to breathe and his condition was rapidly declining.134  
Isaacs was in such a devastatingly poor state that immediately after 
he uttered the name of the man who shot him, he was unable to speak 
any further.135  Even though there were no medical professionals on 
scene, Isaacs was informed by an officer that he would not survive 
the gunshot wounds.136  Additionally, Isaacs was shot at a very close 
range which indicated that the identification was made based on see-
 
looks to the nature and severity of the wounds as well as the actions of the declarant.  Id. 
124 Id. at 110. 
125 Id. at 111. 
126 Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 114. 
127 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610. 
128 Id. 
129 Nieves, 492 N.E.2d at 114. 
130 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 610. 
136 Id.  Although there were no medical personnel on scene to inform the victim of his 
condition, the officer explained the severity of his injuries.  Id. 
14
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ing the assailants face up close, rather than conjecture or suspicion.137  
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the decision 
that the statement made by Isaacs identifying Thomas Clay as the 
murderer was appropriately admitted as a dying declaration.138 
 
VI. THE TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT 
There is a “core class” of testimonial statements which in-
cludes ex parte in court testimony, affidavits, depositions, prior testi-
mony, confessions, and statements taken by law enforcement through 
the course of formal police interrogations.139  These statements are 
formal testimonial material “that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reason[ ] to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”140 
Historically, testimonial statements were not permitted unless 
the declarant was unable to testify and the defendant had a prior op-
portunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time the statement was 
made.141  There is an express indication that the prior opportunity for 
cross-examination was a dispositive requirement and was necessary 
in order for the testimonial statements to be admissible.142  In situa-
tions where the defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination, 
the testimony was excluded when the government failed to establish 
unavailability of the witness.143 
The Supreme Court addressed the Confrontation Clause di-
rectly in Ohio v. Roberts.144  There, the Confrontation Clause of the 
 
137 Id. at 610-11.  Even if the victim makes the statement identifying his assailant when he 
or she is near death, it is not sufficient if these statements are made under conjecture or sus-
picion.  Id. 
138 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 611. 
139 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
140 Id. at 52. 
141 Id. at 53-54. 
142 Id. at 55-56. 
143 Id. at 57.  The unavailability of a witness is simpler to establish when the witness is 
deceased as opposed to circumstances where the witness voluntarily does not appear to testi-
fy.  See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 402 (2008) (discussing the forfeiture theory which 
arises when a criminal defendant murders the witness to ensure he or she would be unavaila-
ble to testify in court against the defendant). 
144 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
15
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Sixth Amendment145 was interpreted by the Court to provide that if a 
witness is unavailable to testify against a criminal defendant, the 
statement may be admitted if it has an “adequate indicia of reliabili-
ty.”146  A statement may be admitted as evidence if it bears “particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness” or falls under the “firmly 
rooted hearsay exception.”147  This interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment was exceedingly vague and constitutional concerns de-
veloped as to whether the rules of evidence involving hearsay dissi-
pated under a newly formed and overly broad hearsay exception.148 
In Crawford v. Washington,149 the Supreme Court‟s focus 
shifted from the amorphous reliability standard of Roberts to the con-
cept of testimonial.150  The Court in Crawford explicitly stated that 
when testimonial evidence is at issue, the Confrontation Clause re-
quires that the prosecutor produce the declarant for in court cross-
examination or show unavailability of the declarant and a prior op-
portunity for cross-examination.151  The Court in Crawford did not 
provide a comprehensive definition of “testimonial” statements.152  
However, the Court did indicate that at bare minimum, it applies to 
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial, and to police interrogations.”153 
The Court in Davis further defined testimonial statements 
when it established the primary purpose test which provides that 
statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indi-
cate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish fac-
tual evidence that may be potentially relevant in a criminal prosecu-
tion rather than obtaining information to meet an ongoing 
emergency.154  However, the Court in Davis did not produce an “ex-
haustive classification of all conceivable statements.”155 
 
145 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
146 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
147 Id. 
148 Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1028.  “Involvement of government officers in the production 
of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse.”  Id. 
at 1026 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7). 
149 Crawford, 541 U.S.36. 
150 Id. at 68. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
155 Id. at 822. 
16
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The Supreme Court most recently defined testimonial state-
ments in Michigan v. Bryant.156  The Court noted that whether an on-
going emergency exists is a “highly context-dependant inquiry” and 
the word “emergency” is not limited to the victim but may extend to 
the safety of the public.157  The Court also noted that whether an on-
going emergency exists is only one factor in determining the primary 
purpose of the interrogation.158  Other factors include the medical 
condition of the victim, the informality of the encounter, and the 
statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators.159  The 
ultimate inquiry used to determine whether a statement is testimonial 
is the primary purpose of the interrogation.160 
 
A. Federal Courts’ Determination Whether 
Statements Are Testimonial 
1. Crawford v. Washington 
The Supreme Court in Crawford recognized the difficulty in 
distinguishing between statements which are testimonial and those 
which are not testimonial.161  The Court recognized that police at-
tempts to obtain information initially to provide emergency assistance 
may progress into an investigation into past events thereby producing 
testimonial statements.162  A statement is testimonial when under the 
particular circumstances, the primary purpose of the questioning 
viewed objectively is to learn information that is or may potentially 
be relevant to a criminal prosecution.163  In contrast, a statement is 
not testimonial when it is made under circumstances which objective-
ly indicate that the primary purpose is to immediately assist with an 
 
156 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
157 Id. at 1158. 
158 Id. at 1148. 
159 Id. at 1160.  The factors taken into account must be viewed objectively.  Id. 
160 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165. 
161 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. (“They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” (quoting Davis, 547 
U.S. at 822)). 
17
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ongoing emergency.164  There are situations in which the primary 
purpose is distinctly clear.165  However, this may be a fine line which 
may often be blurred by a multitude of circumstances.166 
 
2. Davis v. Washington 
In order to clarify the confusion regarding whether a state-
ment is or is not testimonial in nature, the Court in Davis developed 
the primary purpose test.167  This analysis takes into account the main 
purpose the statement was intended to serve.168  Although this test is 
extremely broad and open to interpretation, the Court emphasized 
that the primary purpose test is objective.169  The primary purpose test 
does not look at the actual or subjective purpose of the individuals 
involved.170  Instead, this analysis focuses on the impression that rea-
sonable individuals would have had under the exact circumstances in 
which the altercation occurred.171  A statement is generally testimoni-
al when a reasonable individual would believe that the primary pur-
pose of the statement was to act as a witness for criminal prosecu-
tion.172  A number of factors must be taken into consideration in order 
to determine whether or not a statement is testimonial, including the 
existence of an ongoing emergency, the victim‟s condition, the sever-
ity of the wounds, the objective statements from the police officer 
and the declarant, the safety of the police and the public, the weapon 
used in the crime, and the formality of the encounter.173 
The Court in Bryant recognized that the existence of an ongo-
ing emergency is a significant factor to take into account.174  Howev-
er, the existence of an ongoing emergency is merely one factor to be 
 
164 Id. (“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822)). 
165 Id. at 604. 
166 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
167 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
168 Id. 
169 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
173 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160. 
174 Id. 
18
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considered in evaluating the main purpose of the questioning.175  In 
Davis, the Supreme Court held that statements made to law enforce-
ment at the actual crime scene during a 911 telephone call did not 
constitute testimonial statements because the declarant sought help in 
the midst of an emergency situation and was not providing informa-
tion for use in a court of law.176 
There is no bright line that delineates when a statement made 
by the declarant is testimonial or not testimonial in nature.177  In 
Hammon v. Indiana,178 a companion case to Davis, the police re-
sponded to a call which reported a domestic disturbance.179  When the 
officers arrived at the scene, a woman was standing outside with a 
frightened expression on her face, but she claimed everything was 
fine.180  The police entered the home and saw her husband in the 
kitchen.181  Some officers questioned the wife in room separate from 
her husband, while other officers remained with the husband in order 
to prevent him from interfering with the investigation.182  The police 
took the wife away for a second time and questioned her with the sole 
purpose and intent of investigating a possible crime.183  The state-
ments from the first line of questioning were not testimonial since 
they were made to the officers to deal with the present emergency 
situation.184  In contrast, the Court held that the statements made to 
the police during the second line of questioning were testimonial 
since they were made with the intent to gather information pertaining 
to a criminal prosecution.185 
 
3. Michigan v. Bryant 
The United States Supreme Court was confronted with a Sixth 
 
175 Id. 
176 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
177 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 602. 
178 Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
179 Id. at 819. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Hammon, 547 U.S. at 819-20. 
184 Id. at 830. 
185 Id. 
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Amendment Confrontation Clause issue more recently in Michigan v. 
Bryant.186  In Bryant, an emergency call was made about a shooting 
that took place.187  The police arrived at the scene and found the vic-
tim lying on the ground with bullet wounds in his torso.188  When the 
victim was questioned about the events, he explained that he had 
been shot by a man named Rick.189  The victim provided the location 
of the shooting and a physical description of the man who shot 
him.190  The victim died a few hours later.191  The police officers tes-
tified at trial to the statements made by the deceased regarding the 
description of perpetrator.192  The Supreme Court of Michigan re-
versed and concluded that the statements made by the victim consti-
tuted testimonial hearsay.193 
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed that de-
cision and provided further clarification of the primary purpose 
test.194  The Court ruled that the primary purpose test is objective, and 
that the existence of an ongoing emergency, while a significant fac-
tor, is not the only factor to be considered under the circumstances.195  
Both the actions as well as the statements made by the participants at 
the scene of the crime assist in determining the type and scope of 
danger existing at the moment, not only to the victim of the crime but 
also the police and the public.196  The primary purpose of the interro-
gation is most accurately determined by both the questions of the of-
ficers on scene as well as the victim‟s responses.197 
The Supreme Court in Bryant concluded that the victim‟s 
statements were not testimonial because the primary purpose was to 
meet an ongoing emergency.198  A major factor in this decision was 
 
186 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143. 
187 Id. at 1150. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 1151. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162. 
197 Id. at 1160-61.  The primary purpose test does not look at the subjective intent or be-
liefs of the involved parties, but views the situation and the statements from an objective 
standpoint.  Id. at 1162. 
198 Id. at 1164. 
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the fact that the victim questioned how soon emergency medical ser-
vices would arrive for assistance.199  These facts suggested that the 
victim sought urgent medical assistance with the hope that his condi-
tion would be stabilized.200  There is no indication that the victim 
made these statements with the primary purpose of providing evi-
dence for a subsequent criminal prosecution of the perpetrator.201  
Therefore, under those particular circumstances, the statements made 
by the victim in Bryant did not violate the Confrontation Clause.202 
 
B. New York Approach To Testimonial Statements 
The New York Court of Appeals applied the primary purpose 
test set out in Davis to analyze testimonial statements in many cases, 
including People v. Bradley,203 which had similarities to the facts of 
both Davis and Hammon.204  In Bradley, the police arrived on scene 
in response to an emergency call and immediately observed a visibly 
injured and shaken woman.205  An officer on scene questioned the 
woman, who explained that she had been thrown through a glass 
door.206  As a result of this assault, the woman suffered severe inju-
ries.207  The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the statement 
made by the victim was not testimonial in nature because it was made 
to assist with an ongoing emergency and the officer‟s questioning 
was designed to prevent the woman from suffering further harm.208 
The New York Court of Appeals decided a case with facts 
very similar to Clay in People v. Nieves-Andino.209  There, two police 
officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they observed the 
 
199 Id. at 1165.  The facts indicate that “an armed shooter whose motive for and location 
after the shooting were unknown.”  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164. 
200 Id. at 1165. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 1166-67. 
203 862 N.E.2d 79. 
204 Davis, 547 U.S. 813; Hammon, 547 U.S. 813. 
205 Bradley, 862 N.E.2d at 80. 
206 Id. 
207 Id.  The woman walked with a noticeable limp, bled profusely from her hand and had 
blood on her face and clothes.  Id. 
208 Id. at 81. 
209 People v. Nieves-Andino, 872 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 2007). 
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victim laying the street in between two parked cars.210  Initially, the 
officers summoned an ambulance to the scene and requested from the 
victim his name, phone number and address.211  Subsequently, the of-
ficers inquired about the shooting and the victim stated that he had 
been shot three times by an individual named Bori.212  The court held 
that the identification of Bori as the shooter was stated during an on-
going emergency when the primary purpose of the interrogation was 
to take action to prevent further harm.213  The court held the state-
ment made by the victim was not testimonial and did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause.214 
In these cases, the police officers who heard the statements at 
issue were the first officers on scene and responsible for determining 
the nature and severity of the attack in order to prevent any further 
harm.215  In contrast, Officer McGee was not the first police officer to 
arrive at the scene of the emergency.216  Isaacs had already spoken 
with an officer who was one of the first responders and was aware 
that he would not survive.217  Before Officer McGee arrived, a police 
van was present as well as other officers who assessed the situation 
and acted in a manner to deal with the ongoing emergency.218 
Furthermore, the nature of the questioning by Officer McGee 
signified that he sought information solely in order to determine the 
identity of the person who shot the victim rather than resolve an on-
going emergency.219  McGee did not request the victim‟s name, ad-
dress, and telephone number as the officers did in Nieves-Andino but 
rather approached the victim directly and asked, “Who shot you?”220  
Although the officers in both Davis and Bryant made an effort to 
learn the identity of the assailant, the questions they asked the victim 
were intertwined with a barrage of questions designed to learn about 
 
210 Id. at 1188. 
211 Id. at 1188-89. 
212 Id. at 1189. 
213 Id. at 1190.  The concept of preventing further harm not only applies to the victim but 
also the safety of the general public as well as the police officers.  Nieves-Andino, 872 
N.E.2d at 1190. 
214 Id. 
215 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 605. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 605-06. 
220 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 605-06. 
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the events taking place in the present emergency or to determine the 
likelihood of injury to the general public.221  In contrast to the other 
officers who made general inquiries about what happened, Officer 
McGee asked only one question with the sole intent to learn the iden-
tity of the shooter.222  When McGee did not receive a response from 
the victim, he told Isaacs, “I don‟t think you are going to make it” 
and repeatedly asked who shot him.223 
This line of questioning makes clear that the main purpose 
was not to deal with a current emergency situation, but to give the 
victim a chance to disclose who delivered the fatal blow.224  After 
McGee‟s conversation with the victim, he did not alert other officers 
of this information to locate the assailant or proceed to secure an am-
bulance.225  Instead, McGee went to preserve the crime scene from 
contamination and to locate possible witnesses to the crime.226 
Under these particular circumstances, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the primary purpose of Officer McGee was to obtain in-
formation to convict the perpetrator in a court of law.227  By applying 
the rules set forth by both the United States Supreme Court and the 
New York Courts, the statement made by Isaacs to Officer McGee is 
testimonial in nature.228 
 
1. Controversy Related to the Confrontation 
Clause Exception for Dying Declarations 
Some justices expressed concern about the recent decisions 
involving the application of dying declarations as an exception to the 
Confrontation Clause.
229
  This concern arose from the fact that the 
focus on whether or not a statement is testimonial seems to eliminate 
 
221 Id. at 606. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 606. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 606-07. 
229 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). 
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the common law dying declaration hearsay exception.
230
 
In Crawford, Justice Rehnquist noted that there have histori-
cally been exceptions to confrontation that make certain out-of-court 
statements as reliable as in court testimony subject to cross examina-
tion.231  There are instances where statements cannot be replicated in 
court but are made under circumstances were the declarant‟s state-
ments are unlikely to be false and admitting these statements furthers 
the Confrontation Clause‟s goal of advancing the truth in criminal tri-
als.232  Rehnquist emphasized the fact “[t]hat a statement might be 
testimonial does nothing to undermine the wisdom of one of these 
exceptions.”233 
In Davis, Justice Thomas attacked the primary purpose test set 
out by the majority and the vague concept of testimonial statements, 
stating the analysis “bears little resemblance to what we have recog-
nized as the evidence targeted by the Confrontation Clause.” 234  The 
dissent stated that the Confrontation Clause sought to prevent abuse 
by overzealous prosecutors using ex parte statements as evidence 
against a criminal defendant, however, this new test also encom-
passes technically informal statements that may be used to circum-
vent the literal right of confrontation. 
The Court in Giles suggested that a defendant who committed 
a wrong forfeits his hearsay rights rather than his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause.235  This is because courts have largely ex-
cluded hearsay evidence due to the fact that the statements were not 
confronted and noted the close relationship between hearsay and the 
Confrontation Clause.236  Most recently, in Bryant, Ginsburg raised 
the vexing issue of “whether the exception for dying declarations 
survives our recent Confrontation Clause decisions.”237  However, the 
prosecutor failed to preserve this argument and the United States Su-
 
230 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
231 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 74 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
232 Id.  This was noted to apply to spontaneous declarations, dying declarations, state-
ments made in the course of obtaining medical services and other hearsay exceptions.  Id. 
233 Id.  The court said that this analysis of testimony excludes at least some of the hearsay 
exceptions such as business records and official records.  Id. at 76. 
234 Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
235 Giles, 544 U.S. at 365. 
236 Id. 
237 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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preme Court has yet to directly resolve this question.
238
 
If the view of these justices prevails in future litigation, then it 
is likely that the court will alter the primary purpose test and shift the 
focus on whether the statement falls under a hearsay exception re-
gardless whether or not the statement was testimonial.  Although this 
potential change may affect the outcome of many cases, it is likely 
that the outcome in Clay would be the same under both the primary 
purpose test and the proposed standard set out by the dissenting jus-
tices. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Evidence of final statements made by a homicide victim may 
be accurate and crucial to a conviction in a homicide case.239  How-
ever, no case is exactly like another and it is necessary for each case 
to meet the standards set in place to properly allow testimonial hear-
say into evidence as a dying declaration.  It is important to recognize 
that this evidence rests on an assumption which cannot possibly be 
regarded with the same value and weight of evidence given in a court 
room under all the safeguards provided by cross-examination and 
jury observation.240 
Under the particular circumstances in Clay, the court was cor-
rect in concluding that the statement was testimonial in nature and al-
lowing Officer McGee‟s testimony.241  The statements were made by 
the declarant to a late-arriving police officer whose objective beha-
vior indicated that he solicited this information in order to use it as 
evidence to prosecute the individual responsible for Isaacs‟ death.242 
There was also significant evidence corroborating the dying 
declaration.
243
  The jury also heard testimony from Yvette Clay who 
contacted the police the night of the shooting and another eyewitness 
who spoke with Isaacs when the shooting occurred.244  Both Yvette 
Clay and another witness identified Thomas Clay and Sidor Fulcher 
 
238 Id. 
239 People v. Kraft, 43 N.E. 80, 80 (N.Y. 1896). 
240 Id. 
241 Clay, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 607. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 601. 
244 Id. 
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as the shooters while subject to cross-examination in front of a 
jury.245  The conversation between Isaacs and McGee was combined 
with consistent evidence of Yvette Clay and a separate witness at the 
scene of the crime.246  The evidence presented at trial was sufficient 
for a jury to convict both defendants for the crime of murder.247  The 
Appellate Division, Second Department was correct in its ruling. 
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